This morning I received an email from my “administrator” saying that I needed to validate my email address within the next 48 hours or my email account would be suspended. Seeing as how I’m my own email administrator, I couldn’t remember sending out such a message, I decided that this was likely spam. I’m always interested in seeing how these attacks are actually going to be played out so I clicked on the link.
Neat, Microsoft-y looking screen! And it looks like the backend is WordPress! It looks like the attacker is using the account system in WordPress to collect the information. When you submit your information for validation you get this response:
Your information was successfully submitted, please ensure that you entered your email details correctly; to enable us complete your security updates. If you have entered your details wrongly kindly click back and refill in details correctly.
N.B Please be informed that filling in the wrong details will be resulting to the deactivation of your email address.
I’m guessing my address will not be closed down, since I did not provide my correct email information. I don’t know, maybe I’ll disable my own email… you know, just for the weekend.
Wow, I had no idea that people would care about the start of this project. There seems to be a few questions out there that I’d like to address here to clarify what we are doing and why.
OMG! Fedora is just getting a security team? Does this mean Fedora has been insecure this entire time?!?
Umm, no, it doesn’t mean that Fedora has been insecure this entire time. In all actuality Fedora is in pretty good shape overall. There is always room for improvement and so we’re organizing a team to help facilitate that improvement.
What exactly is the security team responsible for?
We here to help packagers get the patches or new releases that fix vulnerabilities into the Fedora repositories faster. Most of our packagers are very good at shipping fixes for bugs when upstream rolls a new version of their software. Bug fixes can usually wait a few days, though, as most aren’t critical. Security vulnerabilities are a bit different and fixes should be made available as soon as possible. A little helping hand is never a bad thing and that’s what we’re here to do… help.
Can the security team audit package x?
No. This may become a service a different team (also falling under the Security SIG) can provide but I/we haven’t gotten there yet.
I read where Fedora has 566 vulnerabilities! How can you say that Fedora isn’t insecure?
Well, it’s actually 573 right this second. That’s down from 577 last week. 566 was Monday’s number. It’s important to not get caught up in the numbers cause they are, well, just numbers. The numbers only deal specifically with the number of tickets open. Many of the tickets are duplicates in that the same vulnerability might have several tickets opened for it if the finding is in only certain Fedora versions and EPEL versions. Since the same packager is likely responsible for all versions and the same fix can be made we can likely close several bugs at a time with minimal work.
I should also point out that the majority of these bugs fall well below the “world is on fire” level of Critical and the “this isn’t good” level of Important. This doesn’t mean we should just ignore these lower vulnerabilities but rather we should understand that they aren’t something that is likely to be exploited without many other bad things happening. Should they be fixed? Yes, but we should probably be more concerned with the Critical and Important vulnerabilities first. If you’d like to know more about the process for coming up with the severity rating my friend Vincent wrote an excellent article that you should read.
“6. Close bug when vulnerability is shipped in Fedora repos.”
Yeah, that isn’t correct. This is what happens when I try to multi-task. Glad I don’t get paid to write…. err… never mind. Luckily it’s a wiki and someone fixed it for me. Whew!
(We try to not deliberately release a package with a vulnerability. It seems people don’t appreciate vulnerabilities in the same way they like other features. Who would have thought?)
I’d like to help! How can I join up?
Go to the Security Team wiki page and look for the link to the mailing list and IRC channels, sign up, join up, and use the work flow to start digging in. Questions? Feel free to ask in the IRC channel or on the mailing list. You can also contact me directly if can’t otherwise find the answer to your question.
“You’re not allowed to join this video call.” was the greeting I found while trying to log into my astronomy class tonight. Thanks to Google and their Hangout app I’ve missed my last night of classes. Fantastic.
I blame Google for this, honestly, but I wonder if they are really the problem. They provide a service that has complex relationships with their other “products” and they provide this all for “free” to anyone that is willing to sign up (and allow them to track your every move). I’m sure they never said the thing would have certain availability (how could they, they are utilizing the Internet as a transport layer) so I have no expectation of this thing working… ever. And this is what happens when, as a society, we continue to embrace proprietary services that are completely out of our control. Even if there was some sort of agreement that this stuff would work all the time I would still be sitting here unable to join my class. Even from my FOSS software-running computer I am at the mercy of our proprietary overlords. It’s sad.
Do you hate security vulnerabilities?
Do you want to help make Fedora more secure?
Do you have a little extra time in your week to do a little work (no coding required)?
If you answered yes to the questions above I want you for a beta test of an idea I have to help make Fedora more secure. I’m looking for just a few people (maybe five) to sort through security bugs and work with upstream and packagers to get patches or new releases into Fedora and help make everyone’s computing experience a little safer. If you’re interested please contact me (firstname.lastname@example.org 0x024BB3D1) and let me know you’re interested.
This is awesome news. Passing it along.
Originally posted on securitypitfalls:
After everybody said not to use RC4 any more, Google finally enabled one additional cipher on Google video servers: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256.Unfortunately, this cipher is not supported either by Firefox 30 nor by Internet Explorer on Windows 8.1 or earlier.
Users of Firefox will have to wait for the bug 1029179 to be fixed.
This cipher is though supported by Google Chrome and Chromium, so if you’re a user of those browsers, you can finally disable RC4 for everyday browsing. You can do it either by creating a wrapper script, or modifying the shortcut you use to run those browsers to have one additional option:
This will disable following cipher suites:
- 0x0003 – TLS_RSA_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
- 0x0004 – TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
- 0x0005 – TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- 0x0017 – TLS_DH_anon_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
- 0x0018 – TLS_DH_anon_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
- 0x0020 – TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- 0x0024 – TLS_KRB5_WITH_RC4_128_MD5
- 0x0028 – TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_SHA
- 0x002B – TLS_KRB5_EXPORT_WITH_RC4_40_MD5
- 0x0066 – SSL_DHE_DSS_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- 0x008A – TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- 0x008E – TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA
- 0x0092 –…
View original 87 more words
If you’ve recently completed a key signing party or have otherwise met up with other people and have exchanged key fingerprints and verified IDs, it’s now time to sign the keys you trust. There are several different ways of completing this task and I’ll discuss two of them now.
CA Fire and Forget (caff) is a program that allows you to sign a bunch of keys (like you might have after a key signing party) very quickly. It also adds a level of security to the signing process by forcing the other person to verify that they have both control over the email address provided and the key you signed. The way caff does this is by encrypting the signature in an email and sending it to the person. The person who receives the message must also decrypt the message and apply the signature themselves. Once they sync their key with the key server the new signatures will appear for everyone.
$ gpg --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --refresh-key
There is some setup of caff that needs to be done prior but once you have it setup it’ll be good to go.
Installing caff is pretty easy although there might be a little trick. In Fedora there isn’t a caff package. Caff is actually in the pgp-tools package; other distros may have this named differently.
Once you have caff installed and setup, you just need to tell caff what key IDs you would like to sign. “man caff” will give you all the options but basically ‘caff -m
no yes -u ‘ will sign all the keys listed after your key. You will be asked to verify that you do want to sign the key and then caff will sign the key and mail it off. The user will receive an email, per user id on the key, with instructions on importing the signature.
Signing a key with GnuPG
The other way of signing a PGP key is to use GnuPG. Signing a key this way will simply add the signature to the key you have locally and then you’ll need to send those keys out to the key server.
Retrieving keys using GnuPG
The first thing that you have to do is pull the keys down from the keyserver.
$ gpg --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --recv-keys ...
Once you have received all the keys you can then sign them. If someone’s key is not there you should probably contact them and ask them to add their key to the servers. If they already have uploaded their key, it might take a couple of hours before it is sync’d everywhere.
Signing a key is pretty straightforward:
$ gpg --sign-key 1bb943db pub 1024D/1BB943DB created: 2010-02-02 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown sub 4096g/672557E6 created: 2010-02-02 expires: never usage: E [ unknown] (1). MariaDB Package Signing Key <email@example.com> [ unknown] (2) Daniel Bartholomew (Monty Program signing key) <firstname.lastname@example.org> Really sign all user IDs? (y/N) y pub 1024D/1BB943DB created: 2010-02-02 expires: never usage: SC trust: unknown validity: unknown Primary key fingerprint: 1993 69E5 404B D5FC 7D2F E43B CBCB 082A 1BB9 43DB MariaDB Package Signing Key <email@example.com> Daniel Bartholomew (Monty Program signing key) <firstname.lastname@example.org> Are you sure that you want to sign this key with your key "Eric Harlan Christensen <email@example.com>" (024BB3D1) Really sign? (y/N) y
In the example I signed the MariaDB key with my key. Once that is complete a simple:
gpg --keyserver hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net --send-key 1BB943DB
…will send the new signature to the key servers.
After a crazy cab ride from the train station I arrived at a hotel that is in the general area of SouthEast LinuxFest (SELF) but not co-located. *sigh* This side of Charlotte isn’t as pedestrian-friendly as it could be.
The first day (Friday) of SELF was pretty good. I generally stayed close to the security track which included talks on DNSSEC, IPv6, and a history of information security. All very interesting and, specifically the IPv6 talk, got my head going. Being a former network guy I hadn’t had to think about the impact and possibilities of IPv6 on enterprise networks and the infrastructure that resides on those networks. I also learned of a “new” firewall that deserves a closer look.
On the Fedora front, I was able to work on a few Docs Project pieces that needed some collaboration to get straight. I’m also talking up my thoughts on implementing a process to help manage (and close) security bugs within Fedora.
I’m hoping day two is just as good as today was.